Advanced etcd segmentation for Calico
This document describes advanced segmentation of the etcd roles to limit access of individual Calico components or to limit calicoctl user access. It assumes you have followed this guide for initial etcd RBAC configuration of Calico and Kubernetes.
Why you might be interested in this guide
You want to limit access on a per-Calico component level or create limited access roles for calicoctl to the etcd datastore.
Components that need etcd Roles
The following components need certificates with a Common Name that matches an etcd user that has been given appropriate roles allowing access to the key prefixes or paths listed or linked below.
- Calico Kubernetes controllers
- It may also be useful to create a certificate key pair for use with calicoctl, even creating specific ones for read only access, policy editor access, and full read/write access.
All certificate/key pairs that are referenced below are assumed to have been created for the specific component with the information above.
Once the certificates are generated and the users and roles have been setup in etcd the components using them must be configured. Here are the same components listed above and links to their detailed configuration pages:
Below are examples and suggestions when using a hosted Calico install where the Calico components are launched through a Kuberenetes manifest file, this is not required and the configuration could be achieved by configuring services that run outside of Kubernetes.
Per component certificate setup
A setup that needs a certificate for each component is possible while using a
hosted manifest. This setup requires a certificate for each different Calico
component type listed above (cni-plugin, Calico Kubernetes controllers, and
This setup needs similar updates to the manifest like what is described in
Using etcd RBAC to segment Kubernetes and Calico: Updating a hosted Calico manifest,
with the in addition to those updates a separate Secret for each component
must be created which holds the CA, certificate, and key data base64 encoded.
Then the specific Secret for each component must be in the
for the correct pod and the
volumeMounts for the appropriate container must
reference the volume for the
Per node per component certificate setup
While the above is a good step toward locking down access to etcd and would probably satisfy the needs of many, there is a third option that could utilize a different certificate for each component for each node. This type of setup can be achieved multiple ways and will be left as an exercise for the implementor. Some possibilities for achieving this are:
- Installing and starting the Calico components with a configuration management tool which installs and configures the certificates.
- Creating a manifest with a side car container that pulls the proper certificate information from Vault or other secret management tool.